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IVORY TOWER OR HOLY MOUNTAIN? FAITH AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Reprinted with permission from the January/February 2001 issue of Academe
Nicholas Wolterstorff

Is it wrong for a college or university to attach religious
qualifications to the academic freedom of its faculty?
Before I answer that question, let me explain what I take
academic freedom to be. Perhaps it's easiest to see what it
is by considering what constitutes an infringement on it.
Infringing on a professor's academic freedom consists of
impairing, or threatening to impair, her academic position
or standing in some way or the other: firing her or
threatening to fire her, refusing to promote her or
threatening to refuse to promote her, preventing her from
serving on important committees or threatening to prevent
her from so serving, rejecting her candidacy for some post
or threatening to reject it, and so forth.

neutral criteria of competence, and if it's easy to
distinguish the employment of these from ideological
discrimination, seem to me to be living in a fantasyland.

But of course many such impairments or threats do not
constitute infringements on academic freedom. What has
to be added is something about the grounds for the actual
or threatened impairment. Infringement of academic
freedom typically happens when the actual or threatened
impairment occurs on account of the person's position on
some issue, or on account of her publicizing her position.
This issue may or may not be within the person's academic
field; it's all too usual for the threat to be issued on account
of the person's position on some religious or political issue.

In practice, the right to academic freedom is no more
absolute than the civil liberty of free speech. The
formulation concerning free speech in the U.S. Bill of
Rights is absolute, but if one looks at a law that emerges
from judicial decisions having to do with free speech, it's
clear that the free speech is a qualified liberty. Judges
address the facts of the cases before them, and the law
emerges from their decisions.

The fact that te academy has to make judgements of
competence requires that we say more than just that,
however. For an infringement of academic freedom to
occur, the impairment of a person's academic standing has
to based on some other aspect of the positions he holds
rather than their scholarly competence or incompetence. It
has to be based on what I shall call the ideological content
of his position. If the university refuses to promote some
young professor because of the scholarly incompetence of
the positions he holds, although it would be impairing his
academic standing on account of certain of his positions,
such impairment would not constitute infringement on the
person's academic freedom.
The distinction between disapproving of the ideological
content of what a person says and judging it incompetent
is, of course, fraught with difficulty in application. Not
that the distinction can never be confidently drawn;
certainly it can be. Nonetheless, those who talk as if the
several academic guilds--the guild of historians, the guild
of philosophers, and so on--have arrived at ideologically

Let me now join together the two components of what it is
to infringe on a person's academic freedom to which I have
called attention: to infringe on a person's academic
freedom is to impair or threaten to impair that person's
position or standing in the academy on account of the
ideological content of the position she holds or publicizes
on some issue.
QUALIFIED FREEDOM

The same sort of thing is true for academic freedom; it is
no more absolute than is the civil liberty of free speech.
The guideline for the practice of the academy is not the
stark formulation I offered above, but that formulation as
duly qualified.
When a court declares that it is acceptable for the
government to impose some restriction on a person's
speech, is the court saying it's acceptable for the
government to infringe on free speech? That falls strange
on the ear; the connotation on infringe suggests that
infringing on someone's right is a bad thing to do. Better
to say that the court's decisions function to qualify a
freedom. I shall speak of academic freedom in the same
way. Although it's never a good thing to infringe on
academic freedom, every educational institution does and
should attach qualifications to that freedom. The issue will
always be which qualifications are appropriate.
EIGHT CONSIDERATIONS

In considering academic freedom in religiously based
institutions, I can think of eight considerations that seem
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necessary or useful to bear in mind. Some of these
considerations relate to the social setting in which we deal
with the issue of academic freedom; others are matters of
semiphilosophical background.
Modern Society

In the first place, questions of academic freedom arise for
us within the context of a modernized society that
recognizes distinct spheres of social and cultural life.
Some of my readers will understand that I am alluding to
Max Weber's theory of modernization; because I cannot
assume that all are familiar with the theory, let me say just
a word about it.
Weber saw the essence of modernization in the emergence
of differentiated spheres of activity--specifically, the social
spheres of the economy, state, and household, and the
cultural spheres of academic learning (Wissenschaft), art,
law, and ethics. Weber claimed that the dynamic of
rationalization, after disenchanting the world and confining
the ethic of brotherliness to the realm of the private,
brought these spheres to the light of day by differentiating
them from each other and securing the relative
independence of action within them from outside influence.

not. A liberal polity accords to its citizens such ci
liberties as freedom of conscience, freedom to exerci
one's religion, freedom of speech, and freedom
assembly. And it refrains from indoctrinating its citize
into any comprehensive religious or philosophic
perspective; it treats impartially all the comprehensi
perspectives to be found in the society.
Civil Society

Third, the issue of academic freedom arises for us within
a society that exhibits extraordinary scope and vitality in its
civil dimension. Totalitarian regimes, so as to curb all
disruptive impulses,· push civil society to the margins by
massively expanding the scope of the state: business,
banking, manufacturing, and farming all become state
owned; educators become state· functionaries, as do clergy
in extreme cases; and so forth. American civil society is
subject to a good deal of government regulation--giving
ground for much grumbling by those on the political right.
But it is extraordinary how many of our institutions and
organizations do not in any way belong to the government,
and extraordinary how few of us are government
employees. Equally striking is the vitality of our civil
society--a ferment of new initiatives and new organizations
of every imaginable sort.

Whether or not Weber was right to claim that
rationalization accounts for the differentiation of spheres is
not relevant to the subject matters at hand. What is
relevant, however, is the basic claim that modernized
societies--of which ours is certainly one--are characterized
by such differentiation. For it is only in such societies that
the issue of academic freedom, in anything like the form it
takes for us, can arise.

Education

Weber's assertion that, spurred on by rationalization, life
within the differentiated spheres follows its own inherent
laws unless distorted by outside influence is something I
will return to later.

Fifth, it's important to recognize that the religion of many
people in American society is what can best can be called
"holistic." No doubt for some people, religion is no more
than a sector of their lives--perhaps a very important sector,
but a sector nevertheless, having little to do with the rest of
their lives: little to do with their politics, their economic
activity, their recreation, or their moral code. But there are
many other people for whom religion is anything but a •
sector; it decisively shapes their political and economic
activity, how they rear their families, what they believe
about the origins of life, about medicine, about the
dynamics of the self, about the nature of justice and the
benefits of freedom, and so forth.

Religious Pluralism and Democracy

Second, the issue of academic freedom arises for us not
only within a modernized society, but also within a
religiously pluralistic one within a liberal democratic
polity. The liberal democratic from of polity emerged in
the West as a solution to the problem of social order posed
when the citizens of a single state embraced a diversity of
incompatible comprehensive perspectives on God and the
good--some of these perspectives being religious, some

Fourth, the issue of academic freedom arises for us within
the context of an educational system that, as a whole, is
radically decentralized, full of voluntary organizations and
activity, and highly competitive.
Religion
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The Academy

Sixth, over the past twenty-five years or so there has been
an upheaval in the regnant understanding of the academic
enterprise. Perhaps the deepest component of the self
understanding that dominated the academy before the
upheaval was the conviction that well-formed learning is
a generically human enterprise. To put the point
pictorially: before entering the halls of learning, we were
to render inoperative all our particularities--of gender, race,
nationality, religion, social class, age, and so on--to allow
only what belonged to our generic humanity to be operative
within those halls.
A second component in the once-dominant self
understanding of the academy was a distinctive hierarchy
among the academic disciplines. At the top were the
physical science and mathematics; these were the
paradigmatic disciplines. At the bottom were the
humanities. The social science occupied an unsteady
positions somewhere in between. Theology? If one
thought of theology at all, the place one assigned it
. depended on whether one judged it to be rationally
grounded or not. If it was, it belonged somewhere among
the humanities. If it wasn't, it was off the ladder at the
bottom.
Behind this hierarchy was a certain understanding of what
constitutes the "logic" or methodology of well formed
Wissenschaft. The thought was that mathematics and the
natural sciences sat at the top of the hierarchy because they
already exhibited the methodology of well-formed
Wissenschaft. But that methodology was not unique in
principle to them, it was the logic that any academic
discipline would exhibit once it attained the status of a
well-formed Wissenschaft. As to what the logic of a well
formed Wissenschaft was, on that there was somewhat less
consensus than on the other matters I have mentioned.
Nonetheless, the dominant view was that the method of
well-formed Wissenschaft was foundationalist--more
specifically, classically foundationalist.
Although this once-dominant self-understanding of the
. modern Western academy has not disappeared, it has
certainly been shaken, so much so that it is no longer the
dominant understanding. I look on what happened as a
"first revolution" and a "second revolution." First to go to
. was the conviction that the logic of well-formed
Wissenschaft is classical foundationalism. The emergence
of metaepistemology, among philosophers, played a
significant role in this development; when philosophers

moved to the metalevel, they quickly recognized that
classical foundationalism is but one of many options for
structuring well-formed Wissenschaft, and not the most
plausible.
More decisive, however, was a quite different
development. Around thirty years ago, a group of scholars
trained as natural scientists, philosophers, and historians,
began to study the episodes from the history of modem
Western natural science to compare the dominant self
understanding of natural science with actual practice.
Thomas Kuhn became the most famous of these scholars.
What they bumped up against over and over were .
reputable, even admirable, episodes that simply did not fit
the self-understanding of natural science as a classically
One outcome of these
foundationalist enterprise.
discoveries was the breakup of the old hierarchy of the
disciplines, which had been based on judgements about the
degree to which a discipline exhibited the logic of well
formed Wissenschaft. Now there was no longer consensus
whether there was even such a thing as the logic, let alone
on what it might be.
That was the first revolution. The second revolution
involved the repudiation of the conviction that well-formed
academic learning is a product of our generic humanity.
Historically, the academy in the modem West has been
populated mostly by white European bourgeois males.
Slowly, as a result of various liberation movements in
society, its makeup has evolved, so that now significant
numbers of the once-disenfranchised enjoy positions within
the academy. Some twenty-five years ago, their numbers
reached a critical mass, and they were emboldened to say
what they had long felt if not thought, or thought if not
said., namely, that it is sheer pretense to present the learning
of the academy as generically human in character.
The learning of the academy is unavoidably particularist;
it is best to acknowledge that, shed one's allusions, and act
accordingly. The pluralization if the academy is not a
matter of happenstance but of essence. Of course, there are
degrees: literature, history, and philosophy are further from
being generically human than are mathematics and natural
science.
Ideas

A seventh thing to keep in mind when considering the
question of academic freedom is that ideas matter to
people. Different ideas matter to different people, but for
everyone there are some ideas that matter. We all invest
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ourselves in the world, and part of our investment is in the
fate of certain ideas. Their fate, or their apparent fate, stirs
up emotions in us. We get angry, discouraged, or disturbed
when the ideas we treasure seem threatened; we feel
jubilant when they appear to flourish.
All of this is obvious: people care about ideas. I mention
it only because I find it endemic among academics to act as
if it is not true. More precisely, academics want members
of the public to feel jubilation over their thoughts, but they
don't want members of the public to feel anger over them.
Academics want to be allowed to say and write whatever
they wish with only positive consequences. Of academics
alone should courage never be required.
My response is: let's grow up! Stop being adolescent.
People do care about ideas. We had better expect that
people will sometimes get angry with what we say.
Personhood
Eight, and last, it is profoundly important for society to
allow its scholars the duly qualified freedom to work out
their thoughts as they see fit.
How enormously
impoverished, in multiple ways, humanity would be if no
such freedom existed. How impoverished are those
societies in which such freedom is absent.
A reason of quite a different sort seems to me even more
important. The abridgement of academic freedom
constitutes a profound violation of the person, and in this
world of ours, nothing is of greater worth than persons;
correspondingly, no greater evil exists than the violations
of persons. The violation of a person is the desecration of
one of the images of God. The loss of that person's
contribution may mean that the flourishing of humanity is
somewhat diminished; much worse is the fact that an icon
of the Holy One has been desecrated.
DIVERSITY OF LEARNING

Religiously affiliated colleges and universities all belong
to the private sector of American society--to what I earlier
called "civil society"--and the are multitudinous. The total
number of students enrolled in such institutions is
considerably less than the combined enrollment in state
institutions and private secular institutions; nonetheless,
there are hundreds of religiously based (and affiliated)
institutions of higher education in this country. Their
existence in such numbers is a prime manifestation of the
extraordinary vitality of American civil society. In no

other country in the world is there anything like it.
This striking vitality and variety in the private educational
sector, together with the fact that we live in a liberal
democratic society (in which the state must refrain from
inducting its citizens into any comprehensive perspective
on God and the good), means that there is nothing an
academic is free to teach in the public educational sector
that she is not free to teach somewhere in the private
educational sector. But the converse is not true: there are
many things an academic in this country is free to teach
somewhere in the private educational sector that she is not
free to teach in the public sector.
There is, in this respect, a great deal more academic
freedom in the private sector of the American educational
system than there is in the public sector. In discussions on
academic freedom, this point is seldom made; yet it is
indisputably true. In the private sector, one can explore
and espouse religiously grounded lines of thought that one
would not be able to explore or espouse in the public
sector. The memory is fresh in my mind of a recent case at
my own university, which, though not public, nonetheless
sees itself as secular. A candidate for a post in religious
studies was rejected because, some said, her lecture was
too "confessional."
It would be a tragedy of massive proportions if the
extraordinary scope of academic freedom in the private
sector of American education were in any way infringed
on--if it were abridged or restricted. People like the
candidate I just mentioned would be left without a teaching
post unless they "shaped up." Some writers tend to think
through the contours of duly qualified academic freedom
for state. institutions and for secular private colleges, and
they argue, or just assume, that those same contours ought
to hold for all educational institutions. But imposing these
contours would not only violate the personhood of many
who teach in these private institutions, who believe with all
their heart that they are called to live out their religious
convictions in the academy instead of confining them to the
familial and the ecclesiastical sectors; it would also
impoverish our society by seriously diminishing the rich
diversity of learning that the American educational system
now produces.
But if it is indisputably true that the private sector of
American education, including religiously based
institutions, offers freedom to a much wider variety of
academic than does the public sector, why is it so
commonly thought that religiously based institutions
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uniquely threaten academic freedom?
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religion. Colleges in the private sector also get formed for
other than religious reasons: St. John's College, for
example, was formed out of a secular vision of education
as grounded in the Great Books. But far and away the most
common foundations have been religious foundations.

The answer to that question is pretty clear. I do think that
it is important to compare, as I just did, the entire private
sector of American higher education with the entire public
sector on the matter of academic freedom. But one has to
supplement that comparison of total sectors with talk about
particular institutions; it is, after all, not sectors but
institutions that hire professors, instruct students, and are
governed by administrators.

Almost invariably, when such a college gets founded,
religious qualifications are attached to the academic
freedom of the faculty. I see no reason for supposing that
such qualifications are inherently wrong. I daresay we all
agree that it is perfectly fine, in the context of American
society, for a group of people to get together to form a
Great Books college--even though such a college will not
welcome those who think that an educational program
based on the Great Books is a pack of nonsense. So why
would it be wrong for a group of people to get together to
form a college on one or another form of religion--even
though such a college will not welcome those who think
that species of religion is a pack of nonsense? Might the
though be the Weberian idea that Wissenschaft must now
follow its own internal dynamics, so that any influence
from the side of religion is now intellectually
irresponsible? This point might have had some plausibility
before that upheaval in our understanding of learning
occurred, but after the upheaval, it seems to me to have no
plausibility whatsoever.

BOUNDARIES TO FREEDOM

At most religiously based colleges and universities, a
professor's standing in the institution depends in some way
or other on the ideological content of what he or she says
or publicizes on certain issues. And to a good many
writers on the subject, that fact, all by itself, constitutes an
unacceptable infringement of academic freedom. It will
appear that way especially if one focuses on just one aspect
of what goes on at state universities, neglecting the rest-�
that is, if one focuses on the lack of official religious
requirements for faculty at state institutions but fails to
note that those some state universities have severe
restrictions on what a professor may and may not teach
with respect to religion.

I have argued for as double negative: it is not inherently
inappropriate for a college or university to attach religious
qualifications to the academic freedom of its faculty. Just
as important, if not more so, so is this positive point: it
would be a violation of the very idea of a liberal
democratic society if a movement arose to prevent or
restrict the formation of religiously based colleges and
universities. To prevent or restrict their formation would
violate freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and
freedom of assembly. It is characteristic of totalitarian
regimes to try and prevent private initiatives in education.

Earlier I made the point that just as legally qualified free
speech governs our lives as citizens, rather than the
unqualified affirmation of free speech that the U.S. Bill of
Rights speaks of, so also it is duly qualified academic
freedom that we have to deal with in our educational
institutions. So the question is not whether it is acceptable
for religiously based colleges and universities to attach
qualifications to academic freedom. All educational
institutions attach qualifications to academic freedom; none
allows professors to teach whatever they wish. The
question is whether attaching religious qualifications to
academic freedom is inherently appropriate and, if it is not
inherently appropriate, whether the form of such
qualifications sometimes take makes them inappropriate.

But though religious qualifications on academic freedom
are not inherently unacceptable in the American system,
what must at once be added is that when we get down to
the details--as we must--we find that religiously based
colleges and universities do often illicitly infringe on
academic freedom. No doubt about it. Whether they more
often infringe on academic freedom that do state or secular
private institutions, I do not know.

Ever since the founding of Harvard College, groups of
people with shared religious convictions have joined
together to found colleges that reflect their religion: a
faculty gets assembled, students are enrolled, and a
constituency is developed. The religion in
question is almost always to some extent holistic; those
who confine their religion to the distinct sectors of the
familial and the ecclesiastical are much less inclined to
found colleges than those who do not so confine their

Those who have taught at secular institutions would have
to have their heads in the sand not to be aware of the extent
to which ideological considerations, as distinct from
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considerations of competence, enter in hiring, promoting,
and firing. But be that as it may: duly qualified academic
freedom is often egregiously infringed on in religiously
based institutions. The infringements occur when the
religious qualifications are applied unjustly: for example,
when they are never fully stated, or not stated clearly at the
time of appointment; when their application is arbitrary or
irregular; or when their is no recourse available to the
victim.
Over the years, I have acquired a broad acquaintance with
the religiously based colleges and universities of America.
I have learned that the history of these institutions is
littered with stories of unjust, often grossly unjust,
infringements on academic freedom. The stories constitute
a shameful blotch on the reputation of these colleges and
universities and put into question the sincerity of those who
profess high religious ideals for them. I defend the right of
these colleges and universities to attach religious

qualifications to academic freedom within their
institutions. But I must, and will, add that all too often,
they violate the personhood of their faculty members in the
way they apply the qualifications. Often, the person
violated is a brother or sister in the faith of those who
perpetuate the violation.
My own view, then, is that the best service the AAUP can
continue to render to this teeming multitude of American
institutions of higher education is to compose and
recommend model codes of procedure for resolving issues
of academic freedom. Almost always, it is in the
procedure, not in the qualifications as such, that the
injustice lies. Where there is no rule of law but only the
command of persons, where secrecy and arbitrariness
reign, where one never knows when and why the ax will
fall, there justice weeps.

Nicholas Wolterstorff is Noah Porter professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University.

UNEASY PARTNERS? RELIGION AND ACADEMICS
Reprinted with permission from the January/February 2001 issue of Academe
Storm Bailey

As a group, religiously affiliated colleges are much like
those with no religious connections. Some have a lot of
money, but most get by on less. Some have wide name
recognition; others enjoy a regional reputation or none at
all. Some have sensitive and competent administrators
who are on good terms with faculty, and some fall short of
that blessed state. Some maintain high standards of
academic excellence, but others achieve more modest (if
not to say mediocre) levels of academic quality.
Religiously affiliated institutions resemble their secular
counterparts in these and other ways because they are
subject to the same forces and circumstances that affect all
of higher education. At the same time, however, the
religious identity of these colleges has the potential to set
them apart by making a distinct contribution to their
character and quality. In the area of community life, for
example institutional aspirations and policies are often
explicitly linked to religious commitment or identity.
My own college is one of twenty-eight institutions
affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America. These colleges see lives of service, the
integration of values and practice, and the ideals of

character and community as essential to their identity.
Insofar as people on campus--in or outside the religious
tradition--value such goals, pursuing them and achieving
them will be perceived as adding to the college's quality.
It is .not so surprising when the religious identity of a
college or university is taken to contribute to its
community life, but observers of higher education seem
less likely to view religious commitment as integral to
academic goals. Many·people see religion and academics
as uneasy partners, if not completely at odds. This
inclination shows itself when we think or speak of schools
as being pretty good academically in spite of their church
or religious affiliation. It is only fair to note that we have
a good deal of evidence--historical and contemporary--to
justify such reactions. But the question is whether such a
state of affairs must be. Are there ways in which the
religious commitments of colleges and universities can and
do serve their academic aspirations?

The answer to this question is yes on several grounds.
Take, for example, the conception of service already
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